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PREFACE 
This paper is part of a larger task in Systems and Decision Sciences 
that is concerned with institutional structures and their role in shaping 
decisions. A particular problem in this field is t o  characterize the formal 
processes or rules by which groups of decision makers should choose among 
available alternatives. Typically, these rules are formulated as specific 
voting procedures. This article examines certain common-sense properties 
of voting rules and describes a particular rule that is shown to be the unique 
one satisfying these properties. The first half of the paper introduces 
the basic concepts and summarizes the results; the second half is devoted 
to  a detailed proof, using convex analysis, of the principal theorem. 

SUMMARY 
Voting rules on many alternatives may be broadly divided into two 
classes: those that use a scheme of "weighting" the alternatives to deter- 
mine their overall order of desirability, and those that use binary compar- 
ison to  ascertain whether there is an alternative (called a Condorcet alterna- 
tive) that is able to  defeat every other alternative by a simple majority. The 
first approach is identified with Borda, the second with Condorcet. In this 
paper it is shown that the basic desirable property of weighting systems - 
namely "consistency" under aggregation - can be achieved without sacri- 
ficing the common-sense property of choosing a Condorcet alternative 
whenever one exists. In fact, these two properties, together with the 
requirement of "neutrality" on alternatives, essentially determine a unique 
rule known in the literature as Kerneny's rule. 

A C o n s i s t e n t  Ex tens ion  o f  C o n d o r c e t ' s  E l e c t i o n  P r i n c i p l e  
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
I n  F r a n c e  d u r i n g  t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  
t h e  problem o f  d e s i g n i n g  v o t i n g  r u l e s  f o r  a n  assembly began t o  
b e  s t u d i e d  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e .  Two o f  t h e  major  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  w e r e  Jean-Char les  d e  Borda and Marie  J . A . N .  C a r i t a t ,  
Marquis  d e  Condorce t ,  b o t h  members of  11Acad6mie Royale d e s  
S c i e n c e s .  From t h e s e  two men s p r a n g  two s t r e a m s  of  t h o u g h t  
on t h e  p rob lem of  c o l l e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  making t h a t  p e r s i s t  t o  
t h e  p r e s e n t  day.  I n  1770, Borda [ 4 ]  r e a d  a  paper  b e f o r e  t h e  
Academy i n  which he  proposed t h e  f o l l o w i n g  method, which he  
c a l l e d  " e l e c t i o n  by o r d e r  o f  m e r i t " :  f o r  e a c h  v o t e r ' s  
announced ( l i n e a r )  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  on t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  a  s c o r e  
o f  0 i s  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  l e a s t  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  1  t o  t h e  
n e x t - ~ o - l e a s t  p r e f e r r e d ,  and s o  f o r t h ;  t h e n  t h e  t o t a l  s c o r e  o f  
e a c h  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  computed and t h e  o n e  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  s c o r e  i s  
d e c l a r e d  t h e  winner .  Condorcet  [ 6 ]  proposed  i n s t e a d  t h a t  i f  
t h e r e  i s  some a l t e r n a t i v e  ( t h e  Condorcet  a l t e r n a t i v e )  t h a t  de- 
f e a t s  e v e r y  o t h e r  i n  p a i r w i s e  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  v o t i n g ,  t h e n  t h a t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  s h o u l d  be s e l e c t e d .  A d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  B o r d a ' s  r u l e  i s  
t h a t  it nay n o t  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  c h o i c e  of  t h e  Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  
( a s  i n  Example 1 where a l  i s  t h e  Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  and a 2 ,  t h e  
Borda c h o i c e ) ;  b u t  a  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  C o n d o r c e t ' s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  
t h a t ,  i f  a  Condorcet  a l t e r n a t i v e  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t ,  i t  i s  u n c l e a r  
which a l t e r n a t i v e  s h o u l d  b e  chosen .  
Example I .  
Number o f  v o t e r s  
The c h a l l e n g e  o f  combining t h e  r e g u l a r i t y  o f  B o r d a ' s  ap- 
p r o a c h  w i t h  C o n d o r c e t ' s  p r i n c i p l e  i n t o  a  u n i f i e d  method i s  a  
l o n g - s t a n d i n g  problem i n  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  e l e c t i o n s .  B lack  [31 
p roposed  t h a t  t h e  Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  b e  c h o s e n  when o n e  
e x i s t s ,  and o t h e r w i s e  t h a t  t h e  Borda method b e  r e v e r t e d  t o .  
T h i s  somewhat a d  hoc p r o p o s a l  a v o i d s  t h e  fundamenta l  i s s u e  of 
c h o o s i n g  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  a r e  n a t u r a l  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  e l e c t i o n ,  
and t h e n  a s k i n g  what ( i f  a n y )  methods have  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s .  
I n  t h i s  p a p e r  w e  s h a l l  i d e n t i f y  c e r t a i n  b a s i c  p r o p e r t i e s  
s u g g e s t e d  by t h e  Borda and  t h e  Condorce t  a p p r o a c h e s ,  r e s p e c t i v e -  
l y ,  and show t h a t  t h e s e  p r ~ p e r t i e s  u n i q u e l y  d e t e r m i n e  a  method 
f i r s t  p roposed  by John  Kemeny [ l o ,  111. 
L e t  A = { a l , a 2 , . . . , a m ~  b e  a  set o f  m a l t e r n a t i v e s  under  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  E j  = { 0 , 1 , 2 ,  ...I t h e  names o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  v o t e r s .  
A p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  on A i s  s i m p l y  a  l i n e a r  o r d e r .  We w i l l  de- 
n o t e  s u c h  a n  o r d e r  by t h e  s e q u e n c e  o  = ( a i  , a i  ,.. . , a i  ) where a i  
1 2  m 1 
is  most p r e f e r r e d ,  and  s o  f o r t h .  L ( A )  w i l l  d e n o t e  t h e  s e t  o f  
a l l  m! l i n e a r  o r d e r s  o n  A .  
F o r  any ( f i n i t e )  e l e c t o r a t e  M$y, a  p r o f i l e  on II i s  a  spe-  
- - 
c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e  v o t e r s  i n  M ,  i . e .  a  func-  
- 
t i o n  @ : PJ -t L ( A )  . L e t  Q b e  t h e  set  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  p r o f i l e s  
f o r  t h e  g i v e n  A. For  any o  E L(A) and  @ E @, n o ( @ )  w i l l  d e n o t e  
t h e  number o f  v o t e r s  i n  @ h a v i n g  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  o.  
A p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  (PF)  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  f  t h a t  a s s o c i a t e s  
w i t h  e a c h  p r o f i l e  @ E  @ a  nonempty s e t  of p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r s  
f  ( @ )  S L ( A )  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  c o n s e n s u s  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r s  f o r  
t h e  g i v e n  e l e c t o r a t e .  (Normal ly ,  i f  t h e r e  a r e  no t i e s ,  f ( @ )  
w i l l  b e  a  u n i q u e  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r . )  A c h o i c e  f u n c t i o n  (CF) 
i s  a  f u n c t i o n  g  from @ t o  t h e  nonempty s u b s e t s  o f  A ;  g ( p )  r e -  
p r e s e n t s  t h e  "winn ing"  ( i . e .  t h e  mos t  p r e f e r r e d )  a l t e r n a t i v e ( s )  
f o r  t h e  g i v e n  e l e c t o r a t e .  To e a c h  PF f  t h e r e  c o r r e s p o n d s  i n  a  
n a t u r a l  way a CF i d e f i n e d  by 
A 
( 1 )  f  ( @ )  = {a i  E A : ai  i s  most p r e f e r r e d  f o r  some u E f  ( @ )  } . 
I f  f ( $ )  depends  o n l y  on t h e  numbers n o ( $ )  f o r  e a c h  $, t h e n  
f  i s  s a i d  t o  be anonymous .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  f  i s  symmet r ic  i n  i t s  
t r e a t m e n t  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  t h e n  f  i s  n e u t r a l .  ~ o t h  of t h e s e  
a r e  s t a n d a r d  a s s u m p t i o n s  s i n c e  Arrow [ I ] ,  and a  PF ( o r  a  CF) s a t -  
i s f y i n g  b o t h  i s  s a i d  t o  be  s y m m e t r i c  [ I & ] .  
2. CONSISTENCY AND A GENERALIZATION OF BORDA 
B o r d a ' s  " o r d e r  o f  m e r i t "  method may be g e n e r a l i z e d  t o  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  where  t h e  s c o r e s  awarded t o  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  e v e n l y  spaced .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  g i v e n  s - = ( s l  ,s2 , .. . , 
sm) E R ~  and p r o f i l e  $ we may a s s i g n  a  s c o r e  o f  sm t o  e a c h  v o t e r ' s  
l e a s t - p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  a  s c o r e  o f  s t o  e a c h  n e x t - t o - t h e -  
m- 1  
l e a s t  p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  and s o  f o r t h .  I f  t h e  t o t a l  s c o r e  
o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  a i  i s  d e n o t e d  by s i ( $ ) ,  t h e n  w e  may d e f i n e  a  PF 
f S  by 
S ( 2 )  ( a i  , a i  ,.. . , a i  ) E £ - ( $ I  i f f  S .  ( $ 1  2 si ( $ 1  2 ...L si ( $ 1 .  
1 2  m l 1  2  m 
Moreover ,  i f  t i es  o c c u r  r e l a t i v e  t o  s ( i . e . ,  i f  s e v e r a l  
d i s t i n c t  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g s  r e s u l t  f rom ( 2 ) )  t h e n  w e  might  u s e  
m 
a n o t h e r  s c o r i n g  v e c t o r  t_cR t o  r e s o l v e  t h e s e  t i e s ;  t h u s  w e  de- 
f i n e  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  f t  o f S  ( $ )  by 
t ( 3 )  ( a  , a i  ,.. . , a i  ) E f -  o f s ( $ )  i f f  si ( $ 1  2 si ( $ 1  2 - -  2s ( $ 1  
i l  2  m 1  2  m i 
and f o r  a l l  k  < R ,  si ( @ )  = s ( 4 )  i m p l i e s  ti ( @ )  2 ti ( 4 ) .  
k  i R k  R 
Any PF £"or composed series o f  s u c h  f u n c t i o n s )  and  t h e  c o r -  
r e s p o n d i n g  CF i s  c a l l e d  a  s c o r i n g  f u n c t i o n  [ 1 4 , 1 6 ] .  g o r d a ' s  
method i s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s c o r i n g  f u n c t i o n  i n  which no p r o v i s i o n  
i s  made f o r  r e s o l v i n g  t i e s ;  a n o t h e r  example  i s  t h e  method o f  
p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  ( t a k e  3 = ( 1 , 0 , .  .. , 0 ) ) .  
A n a t u r a l  p r o p e r t y  o f  v o t i n g  r u l e s ,  which i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i s  
e n j o y e d  by s c o r i n g  r u l e s ,  i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  I f  two commi t tees  
m e e t i n g  s e p a r a t e l y  a r r i v e  a t  t h e  same c o n s e n s u s  o r d e r i n g  ( u s i n g  
some f ) ,  t h e n  m e e t i n g  t o g e t h e r  t h i s  s h o u l d  s t i l l  be  t h e i r  consen-  
s u s .  1.lore p r e c i s e l y ,  w e  s a y  t h a t  a  PF ( o r  a  CF) f  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  
[ 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 ]  i f  whenever $ a n d $ '  a r e  p r o f i l e s  o n  d i s j o i n t  e l e c t o r -  
a t e s  such  t h a t  f ( $ )  (- f ( $ ' )  $ $; t h e n  f ( $ + $ ' )  = f ( $ )  n £ ( @ ' ) .  
( H e r e  $ + 4 '  i s  t h e  p r o f i l e  d e f i n e d  by t h e  un ion  o f  t h e  two e l e c -  
t o r a t e s . )  Thus,  i f  t i es  o c c u r  i n  t h e  s e p a r a t e  c o m m i t t e e s ,  t h e n  
c o n s e n s u s  r a n k i n g s  c o n s i s t  p r e c i s e l y  o f  t h e  t i e s  common t o  b o t h .  
I t  c a n  b e  shown t h a t  any  s c o r i n g  PF f  i s  c o n s i s t e n t ,  a s  i s  t h e  
,. 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  CF f .  I n  f a c t ,  c o n s i s t e n c y  t u r n s  o u t  t o  b e  t h e  
fundamenta l  p r o p e r t y  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  s c o r i n g  f u n c t i o n s  when re- 
g a r d e d  a s  c h o i c e  func t io . , l s .  
( 4 )  Theorem 1  [161. A c h o i c e  f u n c t i o n  i s  a s c o r i n g  f u n c t i o n  
i f  and o n l y  i f  i t  i s  s y m m e t r i c  and c o n s i s t e n t .  
N o t i c e ,  however ,  t h a t  i f  f i s  a  c o n s i s t e n t  p r e f e r e n c e  func-  
,. 
t i o n ,  t h e n  f  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  c o n s i s t e n t  c h o i c e  f u n c t i o n .  
For  example ,  w i t h  t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a l l  a 2 ,  a 3 ,  it i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  two commi t tees  a g r e e  on t h e i r  f i r s t  c h o i c e  ( s a y  a l l  b u t  
d i f f e r  on t h e i r  r a n k i n g  o f  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  two; i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  
c o n s i s t e n c y  f o r  a  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  makes no r e q u i r e m e n t s  on 
t h e  c o n s e n s u s  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  two commi t tees  t o g e t h e r ,  
w h i l e  a  c o n s i s t e n t  c h o i c e  f u n c t i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  c h o i c e  
f o r  t h e  merged commi t tees  b e  a l .  
I n t u i t i v e l y ,  c o n s i s t e n c y  f o r  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n s  seems 
t o  be  a  less s t r i n g e n t  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a n  c o n s i s t e n c y  f o r  c h o i c e  
f u n c t i o n s .  However it s h o u l d  a l s o  be  n o t i c e d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t ,  
s t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g ,  a  weaker c o n c e p t ,  s i n c e  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
i i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w h i l e  f  i s  n o t .  F o r  example ,  d e f i n e  t h e  PF f  
on t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  such  t h a t  o  = ( a .  , a .  a  ) E f  ( $ )  i f f  a i  l1 12' i 3 1  
2  h a s  t h e  h i g h e s t  Borda s c o r e ,  and no ( I $ )  + nT ( $ 1  > n o ,  ( I $ )  2  
-
7 
+ n T ,  ( @ I  where 0 '  = ( a .  . a .  , a .  ) , T = ( a .  , a i  , a .  ) , and 
l 1  l 3  l 2  l 2  3 
3 .  THE CONDORCET PROPERTY 
Given a  p r o f i l e  $, l e t  n . . ( $ )  b e  t h e  number o f  v o t e r s  p re -  1 3  
f e r r i n g  a .  t o  a .  minus t h e  number p r e f e r r i n g  a .  t o  a i .  Condor- 
1 3 3 
c e t ' s  p roposa l  was t h a t  any a l t e r n a t i v e  a i  such  t h a t  n i j ( $ )  > 0 
f o r  a l l  j # i ( i . e . ,  t h a t  would d e f e a t  any o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  
p a i r w i s e  s imp le  m a j o r i t y  v o t i n g )  should  b e  t h e  c h o i c e  of  t h e  
group,  o r ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  a  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e  most-pre- 
f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e .  A p a r a l l e l  concep t  i s  t h a t  i f  a i  is  a n  a l -  
t e r n a t i v e  such  t h a t  n . .  ($1 < 0 f o r  a l l  j  # i ( i - e . ,  it would b e  de- 
1 3  
f e a t e d  by e v e r y  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e ) ,  t h e n  a i  should  be t h e  Zeas t -  
p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e .  Suppose now t h a t  a i  is  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
such  t h a t  n i j  ( $ 1  = 0 f o r  a l l  j # i. We c a l l  a .  a  quasi-Condor- 1 
c e t  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r  $. ( F i s hbu r n  [ E l  u s e s  t h i s  t e r m  somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t l y . )  By a  n a t u r a l  e x t e n s i o n  o f  C o n d o r c e t ' s  p r i n c i p l e ,  
a  quas i -Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  is  e v i d e n t l y  no b e t t e r  t h a n ,  and 
a l s o  no worse t h a n ,  any o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  
Formal ly ,  w e  s a y  t h a t  a  PF f  is  quasi-Condorcet  i f  f o r  
any $ E  cP and any  quas i -Co ndo r ce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  a .  f o r  
1 
i f f  for  a l l  j  # i . 
I n  g e n e r a l ,  a  Condorcet a l t e r n a t i v e  is  any a l t e r n a t i v e  ai 
such  t h a t  n i j ( $ )  2 0 f o r  a l l  j  # i. We s a y  t h a t  a  PF f  is  
Condorcet i f  
( 6 )  n i j  ( $ 1  > 0 i m p l i e s  n o t  ( .  . . a .  , a i . .  .) E f  ( $ )  
3 
and 
(7) n i j  ( $ 1  = 0 i m p l i e s  (.. . a i , a j . .  . )  E f  ( 4 )  i f f  ( .  . . a . , a i . .  . )  3 
E f  (($1. 
S i m i l a r l y ,  w e  s a y  t h a t  a  c h o i c e  f u n c t i o n  g  i s  Condorcet i f  
g ( $ )  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  set of Condorcet  a l t e r n a t i v e s  whenever 
such  e x i s t .  (Th i s  d e f i n i t i o n  co r r e s ponds  t o  what F i shburn  [ 7 1  
c a l l s  a  " s t r o n g l y  Condorce t"  CF.) F u r t h e r ,  it s hou ld  be  no ted  
t h a t  t h e  Condorcet  p r o p e r t y  d e f i n e d  above f o r  p r e f e r e n c e  
f u n c t i o n s  i s  somewhat s t r o n g e r  t h a n  t h a t  used  i n  [ 1 2 1 . )  
C o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o f i l e  on two v o t e r s  and t h r e e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
where  a l  i s  a  quas i -Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e .  I f  f  i s  any PF s u c h  
t h a t  a 2  i s  a lways  p r e f e r r e d  t o  a 3  i n  a  c o l l e c t i v e  p r e f e r e n c e ,  
t h e n  f o r  f  t o  be  Condorcet  we must  have  
t h a t  is,  a ,  i s  a s  good--and a s  bad--as any o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  
A v e r y  s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  t h e  Condorcet  s i t u a t i o n  o c c u r s  when- 
e v e r  a l l  v o t e r s  have t h e  same p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r ,  s a y  0 .  Then a 
i s  a  P a r e t o  o r d e r i n g  and a  PF is  s a i d  t o  b e  P a r e t o  i f  it a lways  
chooses  t h e  P a r e t o  o r d e r i n g  when one e x i s t s .  (A  s t i l l  weaker 
c o n d i t i o n ,  which i m p l i e s  t h e  P a r e t o  p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  of  
c o n s i s t e n c y ,  i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  a  PF i s  f a i t h f u l  i f  t h e  c o n s e n s u s  
o r d e r  i s  t h e  same a s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r  when s o c i e t y  c o n s i s t s  
o f  a  s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l .  T h i s  c o n c e p t  was f i r s t  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  
I151 . )  
We s a y  t h a t  a  PF ( o r  a CP) f i s  c o n s i s t e n t  on a subdomain 
0 ' s  0  i f  whenever I$',$" E O f ,  and $ '  + $ "  i s  d e f i n e d  and c o n t a i n e d  
i n  0 ' ;  t h e n  
L e t  r be t h e  subdomain o f  p r o f i l e s  f o r  which a  Condorcet  
a l t e r n a t i v e  e x i s t s ,  t h a t  i s  
( 9 )  r = { $  E O: n i j  ( 4 )  ) 0 f o r  some i and a l l  j  f i }  . 
I t  is e a s y  t o  see t h a t  any Condorcet  c h o i c e  f u n c t i o n  is  
c o n s i s t e n t  on t h e  domain T. One o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t r y i n g  
t o  f i n d  a n a t u r a l  way t o  ex t end  C ondor ce t ' s  p r i n c i p l e  t o  t h e  
domain O -  r (which i s  nonempty i f  m 2 3 )  i s  t h a t  it i s  impos s ib l e  
t o  f i n d  such  an e x t e n s i o n  which i s  c o n s i s t e n t  a s  a  c h o i c e  func-  
t i o n .  
Theorem 2 .  T h e r e  i s  no Condorce t  c h o i c e  f u n c t i o n  g and 
3 domain A + r s u c h  t h a t  g i s  c o n s i s t e n t  on  A .  
Proo f .+  L e t  m be  t h e  number o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  For  m = 1  o r  
2 ,  r = 0 and t h e r e  i s  no th ing  t o  p rove .  
Cons ide r  t h e n  t h e  c a s e  m 2 3,  and l e t  A r ,  $*  E A - r .  
Suppose, by way of c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  Condorce t ,  
c o n s i s t e n t  c h o i c e  f u n c t i o n  g  d e f i n e d  on A .  Without  l o s s  o f  
g e n e r a l i t y ,  l e t  a l  E g ( $ * ) .  S ince  $* r ,  a l  i s  n o t  a  Condorcet  
a l t e r n a t i v e ,  and t h e r e  i s  a  j  f 1  such  t h a t  n  ( $ * )  > 0 ;  s a y  j  1  
w i t h o u t  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y  j  = 2. L e t  n  b e  t h e  number o f  v o t e r s  
i n  a * .  Def ine  a  new p r o f i l e  $ on 2 n + n 2 1  ( $ * I  v o t e r s  such  t h a t  
n  + n 2 1  ( $ * I  v o t e r s  have p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  ( a l , a 2 , a 3 , . . . , a m )  and 
n  v o t e r s  have p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  ( a 2 , a l , a 3 , . . . , a m ) .  E v iden t l y  a l  
i s  a  Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r  $, s o  $ E r and y ( $ )  = a l .  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, ($*  + $1 E r and g  ( $ *  + $ 1  = { a l  , a 2 } .  But c o n s i s -  
t e nc y  i m p l i e s  t h a t  g ( $ * + $ )  = { a l } ,  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  No t i ce ,  
moreover ,  t h a t  i f  A i s  homogeneous ( i . e .  $ *  + $ *  = 2$* E A ) ,  t h e n  
9 (2$* )  = g ( $ * )  = { a }  , 
whereas  2$* + $ E r and g ( 2 $ *  + $ )  = {a2} ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  a n  
even weaker v e r s i o n  of c o n s i s t e n c y .  
+The a u t h o r s  wish t o  thank  Bengt Hansson f o r  s u g g e s t i n g  t h i s  
s i m p le  way o f  p rov ing  Theorem 2. 
(10)  Coro l l a ry .  For m L 3 ,  no s c o r i n g  CF i s  Condorcet .  
Theorem 2 does no t  imply, however, t h a t  cons i s t ency  f o r  pre- 
f erence  f unc t i ons  i s  incompat ib le  w i th  Condorce t ' s  p r i n c i p l e .  We 
s h a l l  i n  f a c t  show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  wi th  t h e s e  
two p r o p e r t i e s ,  and t h a t  s u b j e c t  t o  n e u t r a l i t y ,  it i s  unique. 
4 .  THE KEMENY FUNCTION 
A s  an example of  ax iomat ic  t echn iques  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  s o c i a l  
s c i e n c e s  Kemeny [lo] i n t roduced  a PF (desc r ibed  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  
i n  Kemeny and S n e l l  [l'l'l) t h a t  t u r n s  o u t  t o  p l ay  a  s p e c i a l  r o l e  
he re .  The problem d e f i n e d  i n  [lo] i s  t h a t  o f  f i n d i n g  a consensus 
p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  be ing  cons ide red  by a  group 
o f  " e x p e r t s " .  The approach i s  t o  reduce t h e  problem " t o  one 
which i s  analogous t o  t h o s e  of  c l a s s i c a l  s t a t i s t i c s "  [ l l ,  p. 91 
by i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e  i d e a  o f  a  d i s t a n c e  measure between any two 
p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r s .  The o b j e c t  t hen  i s  t o  ax iomat ize  some mea- 
s u r e  o f  d i s t a n c e  uniquely .  Th i s  i s  achieved  by t h e  u s u a l  s o r t  
o f  geometr ic  c o n d i t i o n s  ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  t r i a n g l e  i n e q u a l i t y ) ,  a  
c e r t a i n  n o t i o n  of  "betweenness",  a  k ind  of  independence o f  i r -  
r e l e v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s  c o n d i t i o n ,  and by a no rma l i za t ion  a s sunp t ion  
The r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  axioms i s  t h e  d i s t a n c e  measure, which can  be 
d e s c r i b e d  a s  fo l lows .  
With each  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  a  E L ( A )  a s s o c i a t e  an m x m skew 
symmetric m a t r i x  x u ,  whose rows and columns a r e  l a b e l l e d  by t h e  
a  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  such  t h a t  t h e  ( a i , a . )  e n t r y ,  x i j ,  i s  1 i f  ai i s  
I 
p r e f e r r e d  t o  a  i n  a ,  -1 i f  a  i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  a i ,  and 0 i f  
a j  j  i = j .  X i s  c a l l e d  t h e  e l e c t i o n  m a t r i x  f o r  a .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  
I$ i s  any non-null  p r o f i l e ,  t h e  e l e c t i o n  m a t r i x  f o r  @ i s  d e f i n e d  
t o  be 
I f  $ i s  n u l l  t h e n  s e t  X' Z 0.  Not ice  t h a t  t h e  ( a i , a . )  e n t r y  of  
' I X i s  p r e c i s e l y  n i j  ($1  . 
The Kemeny d i s t a n c e  between any two pe r mu ta t i ons  o  and T 
i s  g iven  by 
The d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h i s  approach is: hav ing  ach i eved  t h e  
d i s t a n c e  measure,  it i s  n o t  c l e a r  how t o  u s e  it t o  f i n d  a  con- 
s e n s u s .  I n  o t h e r  words, g iven  a  p r o f i l e  @ ,  what i s  t h e  o r d e r i n g  
t h a t  can be  s a i d  t o  be " l e a s t - d i s t a n t "  from t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s '  
o r d e r i n g s  i n  @ ?  Kemeny proposes  two a l t e r n a t e  s o l u t i o n s  from 
s t a t i s t i c s :  t h e  median and t h e  mean. 
Given @, a  m e d i a n  r a n k i n g  i s  d e f i n e d  t o  be  any T such  t h a t  
T minimizes  1 n U ( @ ) d ( o , T )  . 
u 
A mean r a n k i n g  i s  any T s uch  t h a t  
(13)  2 T minimizes  1 n u ( @ ) d  ( o , r )  . 
u 
The r e a d e r  may v e r i f y  t h a t  i n  Example 1 t h e  mean i s  ( a 2 ,  
a l , a 3 )  ( t h e  same a s  t h e  Borda r e s u l t ) ,  whereas  t h e  median is  
( a l  t a 2 r a 3 ) .  
Kemeny l e f t  t h e  problem o f  which s o l u t i o n  t o  choose  unre-  
s o l v e d .  But from t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  making 
t h e r e  i s  ample r ea son  t o  p r e f e r  t h e  median, s i n c e  it t u r n s  o u t  
t h a t  t h e  median consensus  l e a d s  t o  a  Condorce t  method, w h i l e  t h e  
mean does  no t .  The l a t t e r  s t a t e m e n t  f o l l o w s  from Example 1 .  To 
see t h e  fo rmer ,  w e  r e - exp r e s s  t h e  Kemeny f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  fo l low-  
i n g  way. For  any p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r s  a and ?, 
where,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  X X '  i s  d e f i n e d  by X . X '  = x . . x . ! -  
i ,  j 11 1 3 '  
h e n c e ,  s i n c e  xu xu = m ( m - I  ) f o r  any u ,  min imiz ing  d  ( u , r )  w i t h  
0 
r e s p e c t  t o  r  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  maximizing X x r .  Thus f o r  any 
p r o f i l e  @ ,  r  i s  a  median i f  and  o n l y  i f  
( 1 5 )  r  maximizes I n u  (I$) xu  . xT = X' xT . 
0 
Kemeny ' s  r u l e  i s  t h e  PF d e f i n e d  by 
I f  f o r  some i and $I, n . . ( @ )  > 0 ,  t h e n  we c o u l d  n o t  have 
1 3  
r  = ( .  . . a  . , a i . .  - )  E K ( @ )  b e c a u s e  r '  = ( .  . . a .  , a , .  . . )  s a t i s f i e s  
3  1 3  
X' xr' > X' xT SO xr d i d  n o t  maximize X' x T .  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand ,  i f  n .  ( $ )  = 0  and  T t: K ( a )  t h e n  c l e a r l y  T '  E K (6) . 
1 j 
Hence K i s  a  Condorce t  PF a n d ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  a  q u a s i - C o n d o r c e t  
PF. N o t i c e  t h a t  a i  i s  a  Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r  @ i f  and 
o n l y  i f  t h e  aith row of  X m  i s  n o n n e g a t i v e .  I f  a i  i s  t h e  u n i q u e  
Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  ( i - e . ,  t h e  a  t h  row of X@ i s  p o s i t i v e  ex- i 
c e p t  f o r  p o s i t i o n  ( a i , a i ) )  t h e n  a  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  m o s t - p r e f e r r e d  i 
i n  any p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  i n  K ( $ I ) .  The f a c t  t h a t  Kemeny's median 
r u l e  i s  Condorce t  was n o t  ment ioned by Kemeny, though  it p r o v i d e s  
an  e x c e l l e n t  r e a s o n  t o  p r e f e r  t h e  median o v e r  t h e  mean. T h i s  
f a c t  was f i r s t  p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  [ 1 2 ] ,  where a  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  
Kemeny's r u l e  f o r  t w o  and t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  was g i v e n  i n  terms 
o f  s i x  p r o p e r t i e s .  I n  t h i s  p a p e r  w e  s h a l l  e x t e n d  and  g e n e r a l i z e  
t h e s e  r e s u l t s  by showing t h a t ,  f o r  any number o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  
t h e  Kemeny r u l e  i s  t h e  u n i q u e  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  i s  n e u t r a l ,  
c o n s i s t e n t  and C o n d o r c e t ,  t h u s  r e c o n c i l i n g  t h e  c o n s i s t e n c y  a s p e c t  
o f  B o r d a ' s  r u l e  w i t h  C o n d o r c e t ' s  p r i n c i p l e .  
W e  have  a l r e a d y  n o t e d  above t h a t  K i s  C o n d o r c e t ;  it i s  a l s o  
immedia te  t h a t  it i s  symmetr ic .  W e  c l a i m  t h a t  K i s  c o n s i s t e n t  
( a s  a  P F ) .  I n d e e d ,  i f  b '  + b" i s  d e f i n e d  and  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  T 
t h a t  maximizes  b o t h  X" xr and x'" . x r ,  t h e n  any s u c h  T maxi- 
m i z e s  x"+"' . xr = (x" + x'") . xr a s  w e l l .  Moreover ,  f o r  any 
o t h e r  r '  s u c h  t h a t  (x" + x @ " )  x T '  = ( x @ '  + x @ " )  . x r r  \re must  
have  X" x r '  = X" xr and x @ "  xr = x@" . x r ,  p r o v i n g  t h a t  
whenever the latter is nonempty. 
Before proving that these conditions uniquely characterize 
K, we turn to a consideration of the polytope whose extreme 
u points are the election matrices X , a E L (A). This polytope 
turns out to have important applications to a variety of com- 
binatorial optimization problems [171. 
5. PERMUTATION POLYTOPES 
Let 
To compute K(@) for any +, it suffices to consider the lin- 
ear programming problem: maximize X' X over all X E P. The op- 
u timum extreme points X give the consensus ranking (s) u E K (I$) .
P is a linear transformation of a so-called p e r m u t a t i o n  p o l y t o p e  
[5,17]: if J is the mxmmatrix of all l's, and I is the m x m  
identity matrix, then the transformation 
defines the p e r m u t a t i o n  p o l y t o p e  P' associated with P. The set 
of inequalities defining P '  (and hence P) are not explicitly 
known (Bowman having proposed an insufficient set in [5]; a 
counterexample is due to A.J. Hoffman). However, various char- 
acterizations of n e i g h b o r s  on these polytopes are known that 
give some computational assistance in finding optimal extreme 
points [17]. 
For any permutation u let S(a) be the set of all u n o r d e r e d  
pairs of symbols {ai,a.} such that a reverses the order of a 
3 i 
and a (relative to the natural order) : j 
S(a) = {{airs.): i < j and a precedes ai in a} I j 
(21) Let Tu be the graph whose vertex set is S(a) such that 
{airs.) E S(u) is adjacent to {airak) E S(a), k f j, if and only 
I 
if {a ,ak) t S (a). j 
The following characterization of neighbors is due to Hoffman. 
(For a proof of this and other facts about permutation polytopes, 
see [171.) 
(22) X@ and xu are neighbors on P - if and only if Tu is 
connected. 
6. THE PRINCIPAL THEOREM 
(23) Theorem 3. Kemeny's r u l e  i s  t h e  u n i q u e  p r e f e r e n c e  
f u n c t i o n  t h a t  i s  n e u t r a l ,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  and Condorce t .  
We shall in fact prove a stronger result. Define, for any 
PF f, the d u a l  of f, -f, to be the PF that inverts the orders 
of f: 
(24) (a. ,ai ,...,ai ) E -f ( @ )  (a 'ai , .. .,ai E f(@) . 
I1 2 m m m-I 1 
The t r i v i a l  PF, T(@) , is the PF defined by 
(25) T(@) = L(A), for all @ E @  . 
We shall show that 
(26) the only PF's that are neutral, consistent, 
and quasi-Condorcet are T, K, and -K. 
Theorem 3 follows from this since of the three only K is 
Condorcet--in fact, only K is faithful--when m 2 2 (they are 
all equal when m = 1). 
To prove  (261,  we b e g i n  by e s t a b l i s h i n g  two lemmas. L e t  X 
d e n o t e  t h e  v e c t o r  s p a c e  of a l l  m x m ,  r e a l  skew-symmetric m a t r i c e s .  
Lemma 1.  L e t  f  b e  a n e u t r a l ,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  quas i -Condorce t  
PF. Then f o r  eve ry  4 E @ ,  f ( @ )  depends o n l y  on  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
Q m a t r i x  x'. Moreover, where X 5 X is t h e  set  o f  a l l  r a t i o n a Z  
m x m  skew-symmetric m a t r i c e s ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a un ique  e x t e n s i o n  
of  f  t o  XQ t h a t  is  n e u t r a l ,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  and quas i -Condorce t .  
P r o o f .  The proof  o f  Lemma 1 i s  s i m i l a r  t o  r e s u l t s  i n  [ I51  
and 1161. With f a s  g iven ,  suppose  @ ,  4 '  a r e  two p r o f i l e s  on 
d i s j o i n t  v o t e r  sets such  t h a t  xm = x m ' .  Choose a p r o f i l e  $ on 
a v o t e r  set d i s j o i n t  from t h o s e  of  4 and 9 '  such t h a t  xmS' = 
x'"' = 0. f  q u a s i  - Condorcet  i m p l i e s  f  ( @+ $)  = f  ( 4 '  + $)  = L(A) ; 
hence .by c o n s i s t e n c y  
From t h i s  it f o l l o w s  t h a t  whenever X' = X" t h e n  f ( m )  = £ ( $ ' I  
( s i n c e  w e  c a n  a lways  f i n d  4" d i s j o i n t  from and $ '  such  t h a t  
xm = Xm" = X m ' )  . We may t h e r e f o r e  view f a s  d e f i n e d  on t h e  
domain o f  e l e c t i o n  m a t r i c e s .  No t i c e  t h a t  any m a t r i x  i n  XQ can  
be  exp re s sed  a s  a r a t i o n a l  l i n e a r  combina t ion  o f  e l e c t i o n  
m a t r i c e s .  Indeed ,  f o r  any i # j  t h e  p r o f i l e  w i t h  two v o t e r s  
hav ing  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r s  ( a .  , , a j  , a l  , a 2 , . .  .am) and ( a m l a  
m-1'"'' 
a l , a i , a . )  h a s  n i j  = - n . .  = 2 , and n h k = O  f o r  a l l  o t h e r  h , k ,  and any 
I 3 1 
m a t r i x  i n  rQ can  b e  exp re s s ed  a s  a r a t i o n a l  l i n e a r  combina t ion  
o f  t h e s e .  For any p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r  n >  0 and e l e c t i o n  m a t r i x  X 
d e f i n e  f ( ( l / n ) X )  = f ( X ) .  T h i s  i s  we l l - de f i ned ,  becaus e  i f  
( l / n ) X  = ( l / n l ) X '  t hen  by c o n s i s t e n c y  f ( n X ' )  = f ( X ' )  and f ( n l X )  = 
f  ( X ) ;  s o  f ( ( l / n )  ) X I  = f  ( ( l / n l ) X '  ) . I t  i s  ea s y  t o  v e r i f y  t h a t  t h i s  
ex t ended  f is  n e u t r a l ,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  and quas i -Condorce t ,  and t h i s  
i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  o n l y  e x t e n s i o n  o f  f  t o  XQ t h a t  h a s  t h e s e  proper -  
t ies .  0 
A p a r t i c u l a r  consequence o f  t h e  hypo the s e s  o f  Lemma 1  is  
t h a t  f  i s  anonymous, hence  symmetr ic .  I n  t h e  s eque l ,  any f  s a t -  
i s f y i n g  t h e  t h r e e  hypo the se s  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  K) w i l l  b e  cons id -  
Q e r e d  a s  a c t i n g  i n  t h e  domain 5 . 
Por  t h e  n e x t  lemma w e  need t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  n o t i o n  of  
derived PF ' s .  For  any s u b s e t  BE A,  I B I  = I: > 0 ,  and a E L ( B) ,  
l e t  a <A-B> d e n o t e  t h e  se t  o f  a l l  m!/k! l i n e a r  o r d e r i n g s  o f  A 
Q t h a t  a g r e e  w i t h  a when r e s t r i c t e d  t o  B. F u r t h e r ,  l e t  XB de- 
n o t e  t h e  set  o f  a l l  r a t i o n a l  k  x k  skew-symmetric m a t r i c e s  whose 
rows and columns a r e  indexed  by t h e  e l emen t s  o f  B, and f o r  any 
Q Y E XB l e t  X = Y<A - B, d e n o t e  t h e  m a t r i x  i n  XQ o b t a i n e d  from Y 
by a d j o i n i n g  a  zero row and a  zero column f o r  eve r y  a  E A-B. For 
any PF f  d e f i n e d  on X_Q, l e t  f B I  t h e  derived PF o n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
se t  B ,  b e  d e f i n e d  a s  f o l l ow s :  
( 27 )  Q B For  eve ry  Y E XB, u  E f  ( Y )  i f f  u<A - B> 5 £ ( Y < A  - B > )  . 
Lemma 2. I f  f  is' a  n e u t r a l ,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  quas i -Condorce t  
PF f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  se t  A ,  t h e n  
B  (i) f o r  any B S A ,  ( B I  > 0 ,  f  i s  n e u t r a l ,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  
and q u a s i - ~ o n d o r c e t ;  
B  (ii) e i t h e r  f  i s  P a r e t o  f o r  all I B ~  2 2,  
o r  
B  
-f i s  P a r e t o  f o r  all I B  ( 2 2,  
o r  
B  f  is t r i v i a l  f o r  all ( B I  2 - 2  . 
P r o o f .  The v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  (i) i s  l e f t  t o  t h e  r e a d e r ;  it 
may a l s o  b e  found i n  [ 1 3 ] .  (ii) p r oceeds  by showing t h a t  it 
h o l d s  f o r  a l l  B, 2  ( I B I  b k ,  i n d u c t i n g  k .  
L e t  B = { a l , a 2 } ,  and l e t  X b e  t h e  2  x 2  e l e c t i o n  m a t r i x  c o r -  
r e s p ond ing  t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  ( a ,  , a 2 )  . Then t h e r e  a r e  
t h r e e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  
{ a ,  , a 2 }  
I f  (28)  ho ld s  t h e n  by n e u t r a l i t y  f i s  P a r e t o ;  i f  ( 2 9 )  
{ a1  , a 2 )  
h o l d s ,  t h e n  by n e u t r a l i t y  -f i s  P a r e t o ;  i f  (30)  h o l d s ,  t h e n  
{ a l  , a 2 }  { a l  , a 2 )  
by n e u t r a l i t y  f  ( -X)  = f ( X )  and s i n c e  a l l  e l emen t s  
i n  xQ a r e  e x p r e s s i b l e  a s  nonnega t i ve  l i n e a r  combina t ions  Of X 
- B { a l  , a 2 } ,  
and -X it f o l l o w s  by c o n s i s t e n c y  t h a t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  f  1s 
t r i v i a l .  Thus (ii) h o l d s  f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  B  = { a l , a 2 ) ;  hence 
by n e u t r a l i t y  it ho ld s  whenever ( B (  = 2. 
Suppose now t h a t  (ii) has  been shown t o  h o l d  whenever 2  2 
I B ~  ( k f o r  some k  < m ;  w e  w i l l  show it h o l d s  whenever 2  2 ( B I  ( 
k+l  . 
L e t  B  = { a l , a 2 , . . .  r a k + l ) r  and f o r  e ach  h ,  1  ( h 2 k+l l e t  
h yh = (y .  . )  be t h e  ( k + l )  x ( k + l )  skew-symmetric m a t r i x  such  t h a t  
t h e  htnlEow and column a r e  z e r o  and 
h  y . .  = 1 i f  i < j i , j  # h 
1 I 
( H e r e  t h e  ith row and column a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a l t e r n a t i v e  a i r  
e t c .  ) 
y h r  w i t h  t h e  hth row. and column d e l e t e d ,  i s  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
h  Q m a t r i x  Z E X  co r r e spond ing  t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  ( a l ,  
-B-{ah) 
- - 
a 2 , . . . r $ i h r . . . r a k + l )  = a I n  t h e  above n o t a t i o n  h '  
Case 1. Suppose (28) h o l d s .  
B-{ah} 
Then by i n d u c t i o n  f  i s  P a r e t o ,  s o  
and 
B h  f ( Y )  = a < a >  . h h  
B By cons i s t ency  of f  , 
But 
u 
where X i s  t h e  ( k + l )  x (k+l  ) e l e c t i o n  m a t r i x  cor responding  t o  a;  
hence by cons i s t ency  
Thus by n e u t r a l i t y  f B  i s  P a r e t o  f o r  B = { a l  , a 2 , .  . . , ak+l  1 ;  hence 
B f  i s  P a r e t o  whenever I B I  = k+l .  The re fo re  (28)  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
f B  i s  P a r e t o  whenever 2  ( IB 1 2 k+l . 
Case 2. I f  ( 2 9 )  ho lds ,  w e  can  app ly  t h e  same argument a s  
B 
above t o  show t h a t  -f i s  P a r e t o  f o r  2  5 - I B J  5 - k+l .  
Case 3. I f  (30)  ho lds ,  app ly ing  a  s i m i l a r  argument a s  
B a  Case 1  shows t h a t  f  ( X  ) = L(B) f o r  a l l  pe rmuta t ions  o of 
B = a  a , .  . . , ak+l}  ; hence by c o n s i s t e n c y  f B  i s  t r i v i a l .  
B There fo re ,  i n  f a c t ,  f  i s  t r i v i a l  whenever 2  5 J B I  - ( k+l.o 
A s u b s e t  C ~ Q "  (Q i s  t h e  set of  r a t i o n a l s )  i s  s a i d  t o  be  
Q-convex  i f  f o r  a l l  x ,  y E C and r a t i o n a l  X ,  0  5 X 2 1 ,  Xx + 
- 
-. 
(1 - X ) ~ E C .  
One o f  t h e  p e c u l i a r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  p r o v i n g  r e s u l t s  a b o u t  
c o n s i s t e n t  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n s  (and C F ' s )  i s  t h a t ,  w h i l e  under  
v a r i o u s  n a t u r a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  it i s  e a s y  t o  e x t e n d  t h e i r  domain 
u n i q u e l y  t o  t h e  r a t i o n a l s  ( i . e .  t o  i n c l u d e  " f r a c t i o n a l "  v o t e r s )  
i n  s u c h  a way t h a t  c o n s i s t e n c y  and t h e  o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  s t i l l  
s a t i s f i e d .  ( T h e r e  i s  i n  g e n e r a l  no immediate  way t o  o b t a i n  such  
a n  e x t e n s i o n  t o  t h e  r e a l s ,  even  though i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  a  u n i q u e  
e x t e n s i o n  may e x i s t . )  ( S e e  f o r  example  [ I  5,161 . ) A s  a  p r a c -  
t i c a l  m a t t e r  e r r o r s  c a n  d e v e l o p  i f ,  d u r i n g  t h e  p r o o f s ,  o n e  i s  
n o t  c a r e f u l  t o  restr ic t  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t o  0-convex s e t s  and r a t i o n a l -  
v a l u e d  v e c t o r s .  Once t h e  d e s i r e d  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  i s  o b t a i n e d  t h e n  
t h e  e x t e n s i o n  t o  t h e  r e a l s  i s  u s u a l l y  o b v i o u s .  (On t h i s  p o i n t  
a  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  c e r t a i n  r e s u l t s  i n  [ 121 , where 
f o r  example  Theorem 2  asserts i n c o r r e c t l y  t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  c l a s s  
o f  f u n c t i o n s  may b e  u n i q u e l y  e x t e n d e d  t o  t h e  r e a l s . )  
To b e  a b l e  t o  work w i t h  Q-convex sets c o n v e n i e n t l y  i n  t h e  
p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t ,  we need  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s .  ( P r o o f s  may b e  
found  i n  [ 1 6 ] ) .  
Lemma 3  [16]. c c Qn i s  Q-convex i f  and o n l y  i f  
C  = Qn f? c v x  C  , where cvx  C  is  t h e  convex h u l l  o f  C. 
Lemma 4 [16]. I f  C S Q n  i s  Q-convex t h e n  c L  (C) i s  convex.  
k  
Lemma 5  [16]. g C  = u Si , where C  c_kn i s  convex and k  
i= 1  
i s  f i n i t e ,  t h e n  f o r  some i , d i m C  = d i m s i .  
A p a r t i c u l a r  consequence  o f  Lemma 4 i s  t h a t  CGcvxCGcRC, 
h e n c e  C R C  C C R  (cvx  C  ) CcR (cRC) SO 
cR(cvx  C  ) = cRC . 
From t h i s  we deduce  r i ( c R C )  = r i ( c v x C )  , s o  by Lemma 3 ,  
Q n f ?  r i  (cRC) GC, and Qnn r i  (cR (C) ) i s  d e n s e  i n  r i  (cR (C) ) . 
P r o o f  of ( 2 6 ) .  L e t  f  b e  a  n e u t r a l ,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  q u a s i  - 
Condorce t  SPF. To show t h a t  f  i s  K ,  -K,  o r  T I  it s u f f i c e s ,  by  
Lemma 2 ,  t o  assume t h a t  f i s  P a r e t o  and  t o  show t h a t  f  = K .  ( I f  
f  i s  n o t  P a r e t o  t h e n  e i t h e r  -f  i s  P a r e t o  o r  else  f = T.) 
The proof that f = K is by induction on the number of al- 
ternatives, m. 
If m = 1 there is nothing to prove. 
, 
Suppose that m = 2. Then, by Lemma 1 ,  f is symmetric and 
consistent; hence (for two alternatives) the associated choice 
,, 
function f is also symmetric and consistent, so Theorem 1 implies 
, 
that f is a scoring function. But clearly the only distinct scoring 
functions on two alternatives are f (1~0) I f(O,l), and £(0,0) , 
which are the same as K, -K, and T respectively for two alterna- 
tives. 
Q Suppose that m = 3. For any X E X , X = (x..), such that 
. 1 I 
e = (a ,a2,a3) E K (XI. It is easy to see that the following 1 
inequalities must hold: 
Now any 3 x 3 rational skew-symmetric X satisfying ( 3 1 )  must 
be a positive, rational, linear combination of the five skew- 
1 5 
symmetric 3 x 3 matrices X ,..., X determined by 
i i 
We claim that f(X ) = KCX ) for 1 2 i 2 5 .  
1 1 
Indeed f (X ) = K (X ) = L(al ,a2 ,a3) by neutrality; also, 
2 2 a ) I  = K(X ) ,  f (X ) = (al ,a2) < a3 > = i (al,a2,a3) , (al ,a3.a2) (a3,alr 
by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  f B  i s  P a r e t o  f o r  a l l  IB( 2 2  and f  i s  q u a s i  - 
3  3  4  4  Condorce t .  S i m i l a r l y  f  ( X  ) = K ( X  ) , f  CX ) = K ( X  ) . F i n a l l y ,  
5 .  
n o t e  t h a t  X 1s symmetr ic  under  a n y  3-cycle  p e r m u t a t i o n  o f  a l l  
5  
a21  and a 3 ;  hence ( s i n c e  f  ( X  ) $ 4 and i f  is  n e u t r a l )  e i t h e r  
Now 
4  
and b e c a u s e  f  is  P a r e t o ,  f  ( Y )  = { ( a 2  . a l  . a 3 )  ) .  But Y + x5 = 2X , 
s o  i f  e i t h e r  ( 3 4 )  o r  ( 3 5 )  were t r u e  c o n s i s t e n c y  would imply 
4  5  f  ( X  ) = f  ( Y )  T\ f  ( X  ) = { ( a 2  , a  , a 3 )  1 a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e  
5l 5  f ( x 5 )  i s  a s  i n  ( 3 3 ) ,  t o  f ( X  ) = K ( X  ) and (32)  h o l d s .  
i Now f o r  any X such  t h a t  K ( X )  = { e l  we have X = 1 A i  X f o r  
i 
some r a t i o n a l  A .  > 0; s o  by c o n s i s t e n c y  and t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  e E £ ( x i )  ~ K ( x ~ )  f o r  a l l  i, 
Thus f  ( X )  = K ( X )  whenever e E K ( X ) ;  hence by symmetry f  ( X )  = 
K ( X )  f o r  a l l  X ,  p r o v i n g  t h e  theorem f o r  m = 3. 
Suppose t h a t  m 2 4. The domain of f  and o f  K i s  
- Q x CX,  and ,  by c o n s i s t e n c y ,  t h e  sets 
- - 
a r e  Q-convex f o r  e a c h  u E L (A) . 
S i m i l a r l y  
( 3  7 )  - 1  K O  = { X E X ~ :  U E K ( X ) ?  
-. 
i s  Q-convex f o r  each a  E L ( A )  . 
- 1  Note t h a t  f i l  2 f - l  ( a )  = {X E xQ : f ( X )  = { a ) )  and K, 2 ~ - '  ( a )  = 
X E  xQ : K ( X )  = {u}} .  
- 
By Lemma 4 ,  c 9  ( f i l )  = f - l  i n  convex f o r  e a c h  o .  S i n c e  o  
- 
-I 
= X.  Lemma 5 i m p l i e s  t h a t  i n t  f a  + f o r  some a .  hence  
- 
f l  - 
- - 
- 1  -1 -I by n e u t r a l i t y  i n t  f 1  + @ f o r  a l l  a .  Now i n t  f a  G c v x  f a  S f o  , 
s o  by Lenuna 3,  
- 
( 3 8 )  xQn i n t  G u  
We c l a i m  t h a t  
- 
(39)  xQ. i n t  f i l ~  f - l  { a )  
Q t h a t  is .  f  ( X )  = { o )  f o r  any X r  X n i n t  f i l .  Indeed .  xu E f i l  . and 
- 
f o r  any X E X Q n  i n t  f  and s u f f i c i e n t l y  s m a l l  r a t i o n a l  E > 0 we 
- 
o  Q - 1  have Y = ( ~ + E ) X  - E X  E X  n i n t  f ,  and 
- 
= (a) xu + (A) ; 
s o  by c o n s i s t e n c y  
p r o v i n g  ( 3  9  ) . 
- 
- 1 S i n c e  xQ i s  d e n s e  i n  i n t  f a  f o r  a l l  o ,  it f o l l o w s  from 
( 3 9 )  t h a t  
- - 
(40)  - 1  - 1  i n t  f ,  n i n t  f ,  = a  f o r a l l a + ~  .
T h e r e f o r e  by t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  theorem f o r  convex sets t h e r e  
o  T 
e x i s t s ,  f o r  e v e r y  o  p T ,  a n o n z e r o  m a t r i x  U E X  s u c h  t h a t  
- 
- 1 uoT x 2 o f o r  a l l  x E f o  
(41 
uUT x 5 - o f o r  a l l  x E , 
Here " " o T d e n o t e s  t h e  i n n e r  p r o d u c t  o f  U and X ,  r e g a r d e d  a s  
v e c t o r s .  
L e t  e = ( a l  , a 2  , . . . , am) E L ( A )  d e n o t e  t h e  i d e n t i t y  permuta-  
t i o n ,  and l e t  o b e  any n e i g h b o r  o f  e ( i . e . ,  xu i s  a n e i g h b o r  o f  
xe on t h e  p o l y t o p e  P). L e t  ueo = ( u .  . )  and r e c a l l  from S e c t i o n  
- 11 
5 t h a t  S ( o )  i s  t h e  set  o f  p a i r s  p  = { a i , a . )  s u c h  t h a t  i < j  and 
l 
a p r e c e d e s  ai i n  o. W e  c l a i m  t h a t  f o r  some A > 0 and f o r  a l l  j 
i < j ,  
u i j  = -u j i  = A whenever { a i , a . )  E S ( o )  I  
(42 
u i j  = -uj i  = 0 whenever { a i , a j ) # S ( o )  . 
F i r s t ,  g i v e n  any p a i r  {a i  , a  $ S ( o )  , l e t  i < j  and d e f i n e  j 
a m a t r i x  X E xQ by x . = - x j  = 1 , and 0 e l s e w h e r e .  S i n c e  
{ a i , a  1 11 
f  j i s  P a r e t o ,  t h e  quas i -Condorce t  p r o p e r t y  o f  f  i m p l i e s  
t h a t  e ,  o E f  ( X )  ; hence ueo X = 0 and 
( 4 3 )  ui = 0 whenever { a i  , a .  1 # S ( o )  . I  
Now l e t  p = { a  , a . ) ,  q = { a i , a k )  E S ( 0 )  b e  any a d j a c e n t  
i l  
p a i r s  i n  t h e  g r a p h  T o ,  where,  w i t h o u t  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  j < k .  
Then { a .  , a k )  S ( o )  and e i t h e r  
1 
e =  ( . . . a i . . . a .  . . . a k  . . . ) and o = ( . . . a, ... a k  .. . a ;  ... 1 ,  
A 
o r  
e =  ( . . . a  ... a k . . . a i . . . )  a n d o =  ( . . . a i . . . a  . . . .  a k... 1 .  j  I 
Define a matrix X = (.xi 1 E xQ such that 
Xij = -X - 1  1 ji - 
j k = -Xkj = 
- Xik - -Xki = -1 , 
xhR = 0 for all other h,R . 
Letting B = {ai.a .ak} we know by Lemma 2 that fB satisfies j 
A 
our hypotheses, so if X is X restricted to the rows and the columns 
A 
corresponding to ai ,aj ,akr then (ai ,aj ,ak) E f (X) and (aj ,ak,ai) 
E f ( i )  , by the preceding analysis for m = 3 (i.e. (33) above). 
Since f is quasi-Condorcet, we therefore have e,o E f(X); whence 
ueo X = 0 and 
By (431, ujk = 0; whence 
(451 - uij - uik whenever {ai,aj } E S (0) is adjacent 
in ro to (ai, ak) E S (0) . 
(46) Notice, moreover, that if {ai ,a } E S (o) is adjacent in To j 
to {ai,ak} E S(o) , then i < j implies i < k (because if not then 
we have e = ( . . .  ak ... ai ... aj ... ) SO o = (...a ... ai... ak...) j 
and {a ,ak} E S(o) a contradiction) . j 
Since o is a neighbor of e, Go is connected (22); hence (45) 
and (46) imply that for some X 
Uij = -U j i = X whenever i < j and {ai,aj} E S(o) 
( 4 7 )  
Uij = Uji = 0 whenever i < j and {ai,a }jz!S(o) . j 
Since f is Pareto, xe E f;' , and we must have ueo . xe 2 - 0, 
that is, X 2 0, and in fact X > 0 because ueo 0, proving (42) . 
Without  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  l e t  X = 1 ;  t h e n  
( 4  8) uea = f ( x e - x u )  . 
Q F o r  any g i v e n  Y E 8 , i f  e E f  ( Y )  t h e n  
ueo Y - 2 0 ,  t h a t  i s ,  
( 4  9 xe Y - xu Y f o r  a l l  n e i g h b o r s  0  o f  e. 
I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
( 5 0 )  x e -  Y 2 - xT Y f o r  a l l  r  E L ( A )  I 
i m p l y i n g  t h a t  e E K ( Y )  . Thus e E f  ( Y )  i m p l i e s  e E K ( Y )  , s o  by 
n e u t r a l i t y  f i s  a  r e f i n e m e n t  o f  K ,  t h a t  i s ,  
W e  c l a i m  t h a t  
( 5 2 )  whenever o  is a  neighbor of r ,  u , T E K ( X )  and r ~ f ( X )  imply u ~ f ( X ) .  
Suppose ( 5 2 )  is  f a l s e  f o r  some n e i g h b o r s  o and T .  Say 
0 Q w i t h o u t  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y  t h a t  -r = e .  Then f o r  some X E X  , 
- 
S i n c e  0  E K;: = { X  E XQ : e r a  E K ( X )  l I  yl = a f f  K;: i s  a  sub-  
space  o f  X .  L e t  
- 
F u r t h e r ,  l e t  ze = C R  (Te)L F, Fa = cR ( Y o )  S It. S i n c e  e and 
o  a r e  n e i g h b o r s ,  t h e r e  i s  a n  X E  X s u c h  t h a t  
- 
Hence t h e r e  i s  a  r a t i o n a l  X* E xQ w i t h  t h i s  p r o p e r t y ,  and 
L e t  = r i ( c v x  K;:) . For every  r a t i o n a l  X E ?I and s u f f i -  
c i e n t l y  s n a l l  r a t i o n a l  X > 0, x* E cvx K-I i m p l i e s  
e a 
x r a t i o n a l  imp l i e s  X I  E K-I ( s e e  t h e  remarks a f t e r  L e m a  
e a 
5) ;  hence {e , a}  E K ( x ' )  nK(X*) = R ( X )  . But K(X*) 5 {e , a} ;  so  
(54) K ( X )  = { e , ~ }  f o r  a l l  r a t i o n a l  X E . 
For any r a t i o n a l  X E W ,  - (51 ) combined wi th  (54) shows t h a t  
e E f ( 3 )  o r  a E f ( X )  , hence X E YeU Yo. I f  X E W i s  no t  r a t i o n a l ,  
i t hen  X is  a l i m i t  p o i n t  o f  a sequ;nce o f  r a t i o n a l  X E K;:.
Hence t h e r e  i s  a subsequence i n  Y converging t o  X ,  o r  a sub- 
- e 
sequence i n  Y converging t o  X. I n  any case  
- 0 
By Lemma 5 ,  a t  l e a s t  one of  t h e  subspaces a f f  Ye, a f f  Yo 
- - 
i s  e q u a l  t o  Y; l e t  t h e  o t h e r  be Y ' C Y .  
- - - 
We c la im t h a t  
Suppose (56) i s  f a l s e .  Then r i  yen r i  Fa = S i s  open 
wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  subspace y ' .  Since  eve ry  p o i n t  i n  Ye i s  a 
- 
l i m i t  p o i n t  of  y e 6 ~ Q ,  and si . i lar ly f o r  Yo, S c o n t a i n s  a 
r a t i o n a l  X '  E x', and by t h e  remarks a f t e r  Lemma 5, 
The XO of (53)  i s  i n  Ye, s o  f o r  s u f f i c i e n t l y  sma l l  r a t i o n a l  
- 
A > 0, 
whence e  E f  CX" 1 . Since  
X I  - x n / ( l + X )  + A x 0 / ( l + A )  , 
f  c o n s i s t e n t  i m p l i e s  
wh i l e  
o # f ( x O )  imp l i e s  o # f ( X 1 )  . 
Thus X 1  #Yo, c o n t r a d i c t i n g  ( 5 7 ) .  Th i s  shows t h a t  (56)  i s  
t r u e .  
The s e p a r a t i o n  theorem f o r  convex s e t s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a  nonzero skew-symmetric r e a l  ma t r ix  U,  u E such t h a t  
* 
U - X ,  0  f o r  a l l  X E ? ~  , 
- 
U X 5 0  f o r  a l l  X E  yo . 
- 
Then, j u s t  a s  i n  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  of (47) , we conclude t h a t  
f o r  some r e a l  number A ,  
u i j  = - uj i  = X whenever i < j  and { a i , a . )  E S ( o )  3 
U i j  = - U j i  = 0 whenever i < j  and ( a i , a . ) $ s ( o )  3 . 
s u t  U E ~  = a f f  K i L  i m p l i e s  U .  ( x e - x o )  = 4 I u i j  = 0 . 
- i < j  
( a i , a .  IES ( o )  
I 
Thus X = 0, s o  U = O r  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  cho ice  o f  U. Thi s  proves 
(52). 
Now suppose f  f K ,  t h a t  i s ,  by (51)  t h e r e  i s  an X* such t h a t  
f  (X*) C K (X*) . Say f 
01-c E K(X*) , o  E f  (X*) , T  # f (X*) . 
L e t  P* b e  t h e  p o l y t o p e  { X E P  : X *  X = maxj. 
- - 
S i n c e  I K  (x*)  1 2 2 ,  dim P* 2 1 ,  s o  by a  theorem o f  B a l i n s k i  
1 2  
t h e r e  i s  a  p a t h  a = IT ,IT , . . . , rk  = T s u c h  t h a t  f o r  1  2 i < kr 
i +  1  i 
i s  a  n e i g h b o r  o f  xIT on P  and IT E K(X*) f o r  1  ( i ( k.  
- 
By ( 5 2 ) ,  a = IT' , n2  E K(X*) and a = IT' E f  (X*) i m p l i e s   IT^ E f  (X*) 
and s o  f o r t h ;  we c o n c l u d e  t h a t   IT^ = T E f ( X * )  , a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  
Thus f  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  K .  0 
7 .  CONCLUSION 
I n  t h e  s o c i a l  c h o i c e  l i t e r a t u r e  two d i v e r g e n t  s t r e a m s  o f  
t h o u g h t  a r e  a p p a r e n t .  One, which s t e m s  from B o r d a ' s  work, 
emphas izes  s c o r i n g  methods;  t h e  fundamenta l  p r o p e r t y  e n j o y e d  by 
t h e s e  methods i s  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t ,  which amounts t o  
s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e y  s a t i s f y  a  k i n d  o f  P a r e t o  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  sub-  
g roups .  T h i s  c o n d i t i o n  seems v e r y  n a t u r a l  and d e s i r a b l e  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  making, and it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
see how a  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  n o t  s a t i s f y i n g  t h i s  p r o p e r t y  would 
b e  a b l e  t o  f i n d  g e n e r a l  a c c e p t a n c e .  The o t h e r ,  which grows o u t  
o f  C o n d o r c e t ' s  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  an a l t e r n a t i v e  a b l e  t o  g e t  a  major-  
i t y  o v e r  any  o t h e r  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  m o s t - p r e f e r r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  i s  
t h e  problem o f  e x t e n d i n g  t h i s  i d e a  i n  a  n a t u r a l  way t o  c a s e s  when 
a  Condorce t  a l t e r n a t i v e  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t .  
A s  we have  shown, t h e s e  two i d e a s ,  s u i t a b l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  f o r  
p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n s ,  a r e  r e s o l v e d  i n  t h e  method known a s  Kemeny's 
r u l e ;  moreover s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  b a s i c  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  a l l  a l t e r n a -  
t i v e s  b e  t r e a t e d  i n  an  u n b i a s e d  manner,  Kemeny's r u l e  i s  t h e  
only p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s .  
The p r e s e n t  deve lopment ,  compared t o  Kemeny's, a l s o  p r o v i d e s  
an i n t e r e s t i n g  example o f  t h e  u s e  o f  axioms i n  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s .  
Kemeny a x i o m a t i z e d  a  d i s t a n c e  measure  by i n v o k i n g  c e r t a i n  math- 
ematically appealing p r o p e r t i e s .  But by c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on t h e  
d i s t a n c e  min imiz ing  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  problem,  t h e  p o i n t  was missed  
t h a t  it i s  t h e  d e c i s i o n  f u n c t i o n  i t s e l f ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  d i s t a n c e ,  
t h a t  p o s s e s s e s  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  p r o p e r t i e s .  
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